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Abstract
Background: The endgame for polio eradication includes coordinated global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine
(OPV), starting with the cessation of vaccine containing OPV serotype 2 (OPV2) by switching all trivalent OPV (tOPV)
to bivalent OPV (bOPV). The logistics associated with this global switch represent a significant undertaking, with
some possibility of inadvertent tOPV use after the switch.
Methods: We used a previously developed poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model to explore the
relationships between the extent of inadvertent tOPV use, the time after the switch of the inadvertent tOPV use
and corresponding population immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission, and the ability of the inadvertently
introduced viruses to cause a serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) outbreak in a hypothetical
population. We then estimated the minimum time until inadvertent tOPV use in a supplemental immunization
activity (SIA) or in routine immunization (RI) can lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak in realistic populations with properties
like those of northern India, northern Pakistan and Afghanistan, northern Nigeria, and Ukraine.
Results: At low levels of inadvertent tOPV use, the minimum time after the switch for the inadvertent use to cause a
cVDPV2 outbreak decreases sharply with increasing proportions of children inadvertently receiving tOPV. The minimum
times until inadvertent tOPV use in an SIA or in RI can lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak varies widely among populations, with
higher basic reproduction numbers, lower tOPV-induced population immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission prior
to the switch, and a lower proportion of transmission occurring via the oropharyngeal route all resulting in shorter times.
In populations with the lowest expected immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission after the switch, inadvertent
tOPV use in an SIA leads to a cVDPV2 outbreak if it occurs as soon as 9 months after the switch with 0.5 % of children
aged 0–4 years inadvertently receiving tOPV, and as short as 6 months after the switch with 10–20 % of children aged
0–1 years inadvertently receiving tOPV. In the same populations, inadvertent tOPV use in RI leads to a cVDPV2 outbreak if
0.5 % of OPV RI doses given use tOPV instead of bOPV for at least 20 months after the switch, with the minimum length
of use dropping to at least 9 months if inadvertent tOPV use occurs in 50 % of OPV RI doses.
Conclusions: Efforts to ensure timely and complete tOPV withdrawal at all levels, particularly from locations storing large
amounts of tOPV, will help minimize risks associated with the tOPV-bOPV switch. Under-vaccinated populations with
poor hygiene become at risk of a cVDPV2 outbreak in the event of inadvertent tOPV use the soonest after the
tOPV-bOPV switch and therefore should represent priority areas to ensure tOPV withdrawal from all OPV stocks.
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Background
Under current plans, use of oral poliovirus vaccine
(OPV) will cease in a globally-coordinated, staged man-
ner, starting with the withdrawal of all trivalent OPV
(tOPV) containing serotypes 1, 2, and 3 live, attenuated
polioviruses between April 17 and May 1, 2016 [1–3].
With eradication of serotype 2 wild polioviruses (WPVs)
now certified [4], countries using tOPV at that time will
switch to using bivalent OPV (bOPV), which contains
only serotypes 1 and 3. This change in OPV use will end
new infections with the serotype 2 attenuated viruses
found in tOPV that can lead to serotype 2 vaccine-
associated paralytic poliomyelitis and serotype 2 circulat-
ing vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV2s). Although
very rare, cVDPVs can emerge in communities with low
vaccination coverage as a result of genetic changes that
accumulate as the OPV viruses and their descendants
replicate during continued person-to-person transmission.
Due to the preferential use of bOPV in supplemental
immunization activities (SIAs), cVDPV2s accounted for
the vast majority of cVDPVs since 2006 [5–7]. The end of
tOPV use will lead to decreasing population immunity to
serotype 2 poliovirus transmission (i.e., defined as the col-
lective level of protection to serotype 2 poliovirus trans-
mission of all individuals in a population) as new birth
cohorts accumulate with no exposure to serotype 2 live
polioviruses [8, 9]. Decreasing population immunity to
serotype 2 poliovirus transmission could allow post-switch
use of tOPV to lead to reintroduction and subsequent on-
going transmission of serotype 2 polioviruses and eventu-
ally to the emergence of new cVDPV2s in an environment
conducive to their further spread.
Prior modeling suggests that any outbreaks following
OPV cessation of each serotype would require costly and
aggressive response to control [10, 11]. Failure to mount an
aggressive response would result in a high risk of eventual
widespread propagation of the poliovirus serotype causing
the outbreak to eventually spread to all areas that lack high
population immunity after cessation of the corresponding
OPV serotype. Moreover, of the two types of poliovirus
vaccines currently available for outbreak response after
OPV cessation, one type (i.e., monovalent OPVs that con-
tain one live, attenuated poliovirus serotype) comes with a
risk of creating new VDPVs, while the other (i.e., inacti-
vated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) that contains type 1, 2, and
3 polioviruses that cannot replicate) does not significantly
affect fecal-oral poliovirus transmission and remains un-
tested in its ability to stop outbreaks in the developing
world [10, 11]. Thus, outbreak prevention remains the
most prudent approach to ensure a successful switch and
subsequent endgame [11]. Prior studies emphasized the
importance of several strategies to minimize the probability
of an outbreak after the switch, including maximizing
population immunity prior to the switch through the use
of tOPV in supplemental immunization activities (SIAs)
[8], identification and treatment of rare primary immuno-
deficient long-term poliovirus excretors with polio antiviral
drugs [12], destruction or high-level bio-containment of
polioviruses in laboratories and vaccine manufacturing sites
[10, 13], use of IPV in routine immunization (RI) programs
in all countries for several years [10], and ensuring a syn-
chronous switch in all countries [14]. The last analysis
showed how decreasing population immunity to transmis-
sion after the switch determines when different populations
become vulnerable to circulation of imported serotype 2
OPV OPV2-related viruses and eventual cVDPV2 out-
breaks in the event of a non-synchronous switch [14].
Assuming successful synchronization of the switch in all
countries, potential inadvertent tOPV use after the switch
may similarly lead to the development of cVDPV2
outbreaks because of the expected decrease in population
immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission. Thus,
preventing inadvertent tOPV use after the switch repre-
sents an additional important risk management strategy
to prevent post-switch cVDPV2 outbreaks.
Ensuring that countries withdraw tOPV from their
cold chains and dispose of any remaining stocks soon
after the switch to bOPV represents an important part
of guaranteeing that tOPV is not inadvertently used after
the switch. Nevertheless, the task of withdrawing tOPV
from every health facility in all 155 countries that use or
stockpile tOPV poses considerable logistical challenges
[3]. For example, in India alone five tiers of facilities
store vaccines as part of the cold chain, starting with
four national government supply depots, progressing to
35 state vaccine stores, then 116 regional vaccine stores
and 626 district vaccine stores, and finally 26,439 pri-
mary or community health centers [15]. Given the
difficulties involved in withdrawing all tOPV from all
facilities and then verifying compliance by all such fa-
cilities, estimates of the potential implications of the
inadvertent use of variable amounts of tOPV after the
switch represent important context for gauging the
amount of resources warranted for tOPV withdrawal
and disposal and for monitoring and verifying compli-
ance of tOPV withdrawal.
This study complements a recent study of the vulner-
ability of populations to imported OPV2-related viruses
in the event of a non-synchronous switch, which ex-
plored the reduction in population immunity to sero-
type 2 poliovirus transmission following the switch in
different populations and the degree of reversion of
OPV2-related viruses that circulate in countries that
still use tOPV [14].
Methods
We previously developed a differential equation-based
poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model (the
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DEB model) that tracks how individuals in a population
move among numerous poliovirus-associated immunity
states due to births, vaccination, exposure to polioviruses
resulting from age-heterogeneous fecal-oral and oropha-
ryngeal transmission, progression through infection stages,
waning of immunity, and evolution of live, attenuated
OPV to fully-reverted VDPVs [16, 17]. We calibrated the
DEB model to determine a set of generic model inputs,
constrained by ranges obtained during an expert literature
review and elicitation process [6, 18, 19] that produces
behavior consistent with the evidence about paralytic polio
incidence, vaccine histories, age distributions of cases, ser-
ology, secondary OPV exposure, serotype differences, die-
out of WPV, and emergence of cVDPVs or lack thereof in
10 distinct situations [16, 17, 20].
The evolution of poliovirus originating with OPV in
the DEB model occurs as a result of reversion of the
OPV parent virus strain given to vaccinees (stage 0) to
19 successive stages of OPV-related virus with increasing
transmissibility (characterized by relative basic reproduction
number (R0) compared to typical homotypic WPVs in the
same setting) and neurovirulence (characterized by relative
paralysis-to-infection ratio (PIR) compared to typical
homotypic WPVs in the same setting). The model assumes
that poliovirus in the last reversion stage (stage 19, i.e.,
fully-reverted VDPV) has the same R0 and PIR as typical
homotypic WPVs in the same setting. In the DEB model,
transmission of any live poliovirus (LPV, i.e., WPV or OPV-
related virus in any individual reversion stage, including
OPV parent virus strains and VDPVs) requires a minimum
prevalence of 5 effective infections per million people (i.e.,
the transmission threshold), with 0 force-of-infection as-
sumed for lower prevalence to simulate die-out in the de-
terministic DEB model. With ongoing OPV use, the
prevalence of OPV parent virus (stage 0) typically remains
above the transmission threshold so that some secondary
OPV parent virus (stage 0) transmission occurs, which will
generate more OPV parent virus (stage 0) infections. At the
same time, a fraction of infections with the viruses des-
cended from the OPV parent virus (stage 0) will evolve to
the next reversion stage, potentially resulting in prevalence
above the transmission threshold and generation of new in-
fections in that reversion stage. Thus, the prevalence in any
reversion stage after stage 0 depends on the prevalence in
the preceding reversion stage and the force-of-infection in
the reversion stage. The force-of-infection depends on the
R0 of the reversion stage and population immunity to trans-
mission. With high enough population immunity to trans-
mission, each infection in the lower reversion stages
generates fewer than one new infection on average (i.e., the
mixing-adjusted net reproduction number (Rn) is less than
1 [14, 21]), so that the prevalence in the higher reversion
stages never exceeds the transmission threshold. However,
with low population immunity to transmission and some
level of OPV use, new infections in lower reversion stages
generate enough new infections (i.e., Rn closer to or greater
than 1) to sustain prevalence over the threshold in higher
reversion stages. This can allow evolution to even higher re-
version stages and eventual emergence of VDPV circulation
(i.e., a cVDPV outbreak). While this characterization of
OPV evolution using the transmission threshold merely ap-
proximates the true micro-dynamics and random events
that play a role in real OPV evolution and cVDPV emer-
gence, it accounts for the interplay between OPV use and
population immunity [8] and has adequately reproduced
cVDPV outbreaks in places like northwest Nigeria (serotype
2), Madura (Indonesia; serotype 1), Haiti (serotype 1),
northern India (serotype 2) and lack of cVDPV outbreaks
despite widespread OPV use in places like the USA, the
Netherlands (following an outbreak in 1992–3), Israel,
Tajikistan, Albania, Cuba, northwest Nigeria (serotypes 1 in
and 3) and northern India (serotypes 1 and 3) [16, 17, 20].
In a prior analysis [14] we used the Rn of OPV2-
related viruses in various reversion stages as a proxy
measure of the vulnerability to widespread circulation
following an importation of such a virus from a popula-
tion that did not yet switch, with an Rn > 1 indicating a
minimum condition for circulation. In this study, we
focus on inadvertent tOPV use in a population that has
already switched, which differs from point introductions
in two ways that change the minimum Rn of OPV2-
related virus needed for subsequent circulation and out-
breaks. First, inadvertent tOPV use implies an introduc-
tion of OPV2 parent virus (stage 0) while importations
may involve more reverted and thus relatively more
transmissible OPV2-related virus that imply a potentially
higher risk of circulation. Second, inadvertent tOPV use
potentially involves large numbers of doses given to chil-
dren in a short period of time, while importations repre-
sent point introductions. Inadvertent administration of a
large number of tOPV doses implies some possibility
that one of the doses by chance leads to a high degree of
reversion through successive transmissions or mutations
occurring in individual recipients [22]. The DEB model
mimics this possible outcome because more inadvertent
tOPV doses results in a higher prevalence of OPV parent
virus (stage 0) and virus in subsequent stages. However,
this may or may not lead to emergence of highly-reverted
virus and eventual cVDPV2 outbreaks, depending on the
preexisting population immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus
transmission and the population immunity induced by the
inadvertent tOPV use.
We examine inadvertent tOPV use both in an SIA
(Analysis I) and in routine immunization (RI) (Analysis
II) and determine under which conditions such use can
lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak. The analysis of inadvertent
tOPV use in an SIA assesses the consequences of a one-
time simultaneous administration of tOPV to children
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aged 0–4 years, while the analysis of inadvertent tOPV use
in RI assesses the consequences of administering tOPV
over time to children aged 0–1 years as they reach sched-
uled ages for OPV doses (approximated in the DEB model
to occur as a single dose at birth (for countries that give a
birth dose) and the cumulative effect of 3 non-birth doses
at 3 months) [16]. For Analysis I, we focus on the inter-
action between the extent of inadvertent tOPV use in an
SIA and the time after the switch when this occurs. For
Analysis II, we consider different potential patterns of
continued inadvertent tOPV use in RI (Fig. 1). A pattern
of exponential decay corresponds to a scenario in which a
population gradually uses up all tOPV in its RI supply
chain until exhausted. For this scenario, we determine the
minimum half-life (i.e., the time over which the extent of
tOPV use decreases by a half) for which the inadvertent
tOPV use in RI leads to a cVDPV2 outbreak. A rectangu-
lar pattern corresponds to a scenario in which some frac-
tion of health centers in a population inadvertently
continue to use tOPV for a period of time after the switch.
For this scenario, we focus on the interaction between the
extent of inadvertent tOPV use (i.e., the height of the rect-
angle) and its duration (i.e., the length of the rectangle).
All processes in the DEB model (e.g., vaccination, mix-
ing and poliovirus transmission, die-out, OPV evolution,
and outbreak detection) occur on a per-capita basis and
consequently the model remains completely scalable.
For example, post-switch inadvertent administration of
1,000 tOPV doses in a population of 10 million people
produces 10 times higher absolute incidence of polio-
virus infections and paralytic cases but exactly the same
transmission and OPV evolution dynamics as inadvert-
ent administration of 100 tOPV doses in a population of
1 million people with otherwise identical properties, in-
cluding spatially-homogeneous mixing. Therefore, rather
than specifying absolute numbers of inadvertent tOPV
doses and population sizes, for Analysis I we express the
extent of inadvertent tOPV use in an SIA in terms of
the proportion of children aged 0–4 years in the popula-
tion who inadvertently receive a dose of tOPV instead of
bOPV during an SIA (i.e., the inadvertent tOPV SIA
coverage). For Analysis II, we express the extent of inad-
vertent tOPV use in RI in terms of the proportion of
OPV RI doses inadvertently given as tOPV instead of
bOPV (i.e., the inadvertent tOPV RI proportion).
The left columns of Table 1 provide the properties of
all populations in which we explored the implications of
inadvertent tOPV use. For both Analysis I and II, we
first examine inadvertent tOPV use after the switch in a
hypothetical population with no seasonal variation in R0
values. We assume no seasonality to ensure a continu-
ous decrease in the ability of polioviruses to transmit
(i.e., the Rn) as population immunity to serotype 2 polio-
virus transmission decreases after the switch. This yields
a theoretical minimum time and Rn until inadvertent
tOPV use may lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak. We repeat
the analysis for two different R0 values to demonstrate
the impact of population-specific characteristics also
without the complication of seasonality. In the DEB
model, the R0 values of all serotypes and reversion stages
depend directly on the R0 of serotype 1 wild poliovirus
(WPV1), which we multiply by the appropriate serotype-
specific relative R0 values (i.e., 0.9 and 0.75 for serotypes
2 and 3, respectively) [16, 17]. For brevity, we use the R0
of WPV1 as a general measure of the inherent transmis-
sibility of polioviruses in any given population (i.e., in-
stead of listing the values for each serotype).
In real populations, R0 varies seasonally, which means
that the time during the year of inadvertent tOPV use
influences the risk that the use leads to a cVDPV2 out-
break. As with the earlier study [14], we adopt the proper-
ties from selected populations included in an integrated
global model for long-term poliovirus risk management
(i.e., the global model) [10] as representative of real popu-
lations to serve as examples of when inadvertent tOPV
use after the switch may lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak in
realistic populations.. The properties (Table 1) include the
R0 value for WPV1 and its seasonal variation through si-
nusoidal variation of the R0 values according to given
amplitude and annual peak day [16] and thus the results of
our model for the realistic populations account for the
effect of seasonality. Other properties include the propor-
tion of transmissions occurring via the oropharyngeal route
(poro, which strongly influences the ability of IPV alone to
provide population immunity to transmission, since IPV
provides good protection from oropharyngeal excretion
but little protection from fecal excretion [18, 23]), the take
rate of the serotype 2 component of tOPV (tr), the quality
of acute flaccid paralysis (i.e., modeled using a detection
threshold (dt) of cumulative paralytic cases that need to
occur for the surveillance system to detect an outbreak),
Fig. 1 Modeled patterns of inadvertent trivalent oral poliovirus
vaccine (tOPV) use in routine immunization (RI) (Analysis II)
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and a simplified vaccination history (i.e., RI coverage with
3 or more poliovirus vaccine doses (POL3) and any
changes in RI vaccines, historic SIA frequency and SIA
vaccine choices, and SIA quality). To determine the
demographic profilesfor the populations, we directly
adopt the average birth rates and age-specific mortal-
ity rates of populations from the global model, which
differentiates by income level and polio vaccine use
as of 2013 (i.e., OPV-only, IPV-only, or IPV/OPV)
[10]. We focus on realistic populations with proper-
ties like those of northern India, northern Pakistan
and Afghanistan, northern Nigeria, and Ukraine be-
cause they represent high-risk settings due to high R0
values, the presence of under-vaccinated subpopula-
tions, and/or recent disruptions in immunization pro-
grams. The population with properties like those of
Ukraine includes some adaptations relative to the glo-
bal model assumptions for this part of the world to
account for specifics of this example, including POL3
of 90 % before 2010 followed by a drop to 70 % (gen-
eral population) or 30 % (under-vaccinated popula-
tion), a series of SIAs in the 1990s, and adoption of
an IPV/OPV sequential schedule (i.e., 2 doses of IPV
followed by 2 doses of tOPV) in 2005 [14]. All other
populations assume introduction of a single IPV dose
on January 1, 2015. Although the realistic populations in
Table 1 reflect assumptions representative of true settings
based on prior work [17, 19], the use of simplified vaccin-
ation histories from the global model [10] means that the
models will not exactly reproduce the paralytic polio inci-
dence, WPV elimination, and past cVDPV outbreaks in
those populations. However, we believe that the model
arrives at accurate estimates of levels of population im-
munity to transmission at the time of the switch and
beyond in real populations because the assumptions about
R0, RI coverage, SIA frequency and quality, and other
Table 1 Populations modeled and tabulated selected results from Fig. 2 (Analysis I)
Population with
properties like
Properties Minimum time (years) since switch when
inadvertent tOPV use in an SIA leads to a
cVDPV2 outbreak for indicated inadvertent
tOPV SIA coverage
Income level R0
a poro tr POL3 # tOPV SIAs
(2015–2016)




Hypothetical population Lower middle 0.3 0.6 0.3 4 0.8 0.7 1
- High R0 13
b 1.2 0.83 0.72 0.47 (0.15)
- Lower R0 10
b 1.8 1.3 1.1 0.86 (0.15)
Northern India Lower middle 13c 0.3 0.6 6 1
- Under-vaccinated 0.3 0.8 0.7 1.2 0.88 0.82 0.65 (0.2)
- General 0.6 0.95 0.5 1.7 0.95 0.87 0.71 (0.2)
Northern Pakistan/
Afghanistan
Low 11c 0.3 0.65 3
- Under-vaccinated 0.1 5 0.35 0.95 0.94 0.76 0.7 0.52 (0.15)
- General 0.6 4 0.8 0.7 1.8 0.99 0.91 0.75 (0.2)
Northern Nigeria Lower middle 8d 0.3 0.7 7
- Under-vaccinated 0.05 0.15 0.95 3 1.5 0.8 0.7 0.51 (0.1)
- General 3 0.8 0.7 2 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.3 (0.1)
Ukraine Upper middle 6e 0.8 0.74 0 0.8 0.7 3
- Under-vaccinated 0.3f 2.9 1.8 0.93 0.82 (0.1)
- General 0.7f 32 12 8.9 6.7 (0.1)
Abbreviations: cVDPV2 serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus, RI routine immunization, SIA supplemental immunization activity, tOPV trivalent oral
poliovirus vaccine, WPV wild poliovirus
Model input symbols: [8, 16] R0 average annual basic reproduction number for WPV of serotype 1, tr take rate of serotype 2 tOPV, POL3 RI coverage with 3 or more
non-birth doses, TC true coverage of each SIA, poro proportion of transmissions via oropharyngeal route, dt detection threshold (cumulative paralytic polio cases
per 10 million people until outbreak detection occurs)
aThe model uses R0 for serotype 1 WPV to characterize variability in subpopulations; R0 for serotype 2 WPV equals 0.9 times the values shown in this column
bNo seasonality
cSeasonal amplitude in R0 of 20 % with peak on 180
th day of each year
dSeasonal amplitude in R0 of 10 % with peak on 120
th day of each year
eSeasonal amplitude in R0 of 40 % with peak on 180
th day of each year
fAssume POL3 = 90 % prior to 2010
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properties remain similar to those of real populations
[10, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24–26].
For the hypothetical population in Analysis I, we vary
the inadvertent tOPV SIA coverage from 0.1 to 99 % to
explore the full relationship between the inadvertent
tOPV SIA coverage and the minimum time until the
inadvertent tOPV use in an SIA leads to a cVDPV2 out-
break. After determining from the hypothetical popula-
tion the inadvertent SIA coverage above which the risk
of an eventual cVDPV2 outbreak decreases due to the
immunity provided by the inadvertent tOPV use in an
SIA, for the realistic populations we estimate the mini-
mum time until inadvertent tOPV use in an SIA leads to
a cVDPV2 outbreak for inadvertent tOPV SIA coverage
of 0.1, 0.5, 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 %. We determine the
minimum time until the inadvertent tOPV use in an SIA
leads to a cVDPV2 outbreak in the model by iteratively
varying the first day of the 5-day SIA until detection of
an outbreak, based on the population-specific detection
thresholds (Table 1). Similarly, for Analysis II, we vary
the inadvertent tOPV RI proportion from 0.1 to 100 %
for the hypothetical population to determine the inad-
vertent tOPV RI proportion above which the risk of an
eventual cVDPV2 outbreak decreases due to the immun-
ity provided by the inadvertent tOPV use in RI. For the
realistic populations, we consider inadvertent tOPV RI
proportions of 0.5, 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 50 % and
use the same iterative approach to determine the
shortest duration of inadvertent tOPV use that leads
to an eventual cVDPV2 outbreak in the model. If the
shortest duration occurs for an inadvertent tOPV RI
proportion of 25 or 50 %, we also run values of 30,
35, 40, and 45 % to determine the approximate short-
est duration in that range.
Results
Figure 2 shows the results of Analysis I and illustrates
the relationship between the inadvertent tOPV SIA
coverage and the minimum time since the switch for the
inadvertent tOPV use to lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak.
Table 1 includes selected results from Fig. 2 in tabulated
form. Inadvertent administration of tOPV to a very small
proportion of children (i.e., 0.1 %) in a hypothetical
population with no seasonality only leads to a cVDPV2
outbreak if it occurs more than a year after the switch,
when population immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus
transmission has decreased significantly (Fig. 2a). Once
population immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmis-
sion decreases sufficiently, some transmission of OPV
parent virus (stage 0) can occur, which leads to reversion
to subsequent stages of OPV2-related virus and circula-
tion of those viruses (i.e., prevalence exceeding the
transmission threshold), until ultimately a reversion
stage that can self-amplify (i.e., Rn exceeds 1) begins to
circulate. Once this occurs, circulation and reversion
continues and a cVDPV2 outbreak will occur. We ob-
served that inadvertent administration of tOPV to 0.1 %
of children aged 0–4 years in an SIA leads to a cVDPV2
outbreak if it occurs when the Rn of OPV2 (stage 0) in
the model exceeds approximately 0.85. Thus, while the
Rn of OPV2 parent virus (stage 0) remains less than 1 at
the time of the inadvertent tOPV use, even a small frac-
tion receiving an inadvertent tOPV dose can generate
enough reversion to start circulation of higher reversion
stages. The Rn for OPV2 parent virus (stage 0) at the
time of the switch depends in part on the assumed R0
(i.e., Rn equals 0.44 for an R0 of 13 and Rn equals 0.49
for an R0 of 10), and consequently the time until Rn
reaches a high enough value to allow a cVDPV2
Fig. 2 Minimum time until inadvertent trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV) use in a supplemental immunization activity (SIA) leads to a
serotype 2 vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) outbreak (Analysis I) a in a hypothetical population with no seasonality in the basic reproduction
number (R0) b in realistic populations with seasonality
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outbreak following inadvertent tOPV use depends on
the assumed R0. Assuming an R0 of 13, Rn for OPV2
parent virus (stage 0) first exceeds 0.85 447 days after
the switch in the hypothetical population, while for an
R0 of 10, this only occurs after 655 days (Fig. 2a).
As we increase the inadvertent tOPV SIA coverage,
the prevalence in subsequent reversion stages due to
reversion and secondary transmission also increases.
Therefore, an eventual cVDPV2 outbreak can occur for
lower Rn values of OPV2 parent virus (stage 0) and thus
sooner after the switch as larger proportions of children
receive tOPV simultaneously after the switch. For ex-
ample, with inadvertent tOPV SIA coverage of 1 %, a
cVDPV2 outbreak can occur when the Rn of OPV2 par-
ent virus (stage 0) exceeds approximately 0.65 at the
time of the inadvertent tOPV SIA, corresponding to 262
or 415 days after the switch for an assumed R0 of WPV1
of 13 or 10, respectively. As we further increase the in-
advertent tOPV SIA coverage, the time until inadvertent
tOPV use in an SIA can lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak fur-
ther decreases. However, at inadvertent tOPV SIA cover-
age of around 15 %, the inadvertent tOPV use in an SIA
begins to confer sufficient population immunity to sero-
type 2 poliovirus transmission to reduce Rn and thus
make it more difficult for a cVDPV2 to emerge. This
represents the worst-case scenario of inadvertent tOPV
use in an SIA in a spatially-homogenously mixing popu-
lation, with greater inadvertent tOPV SIA coverage less
likely to lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak (i.e., higher Rn of
OPV2 needed and longer time since the switch). With
inadvertent tOPV SIA coverage of 15 %, the shortest
time since the switch for the inadvertent tOPV use to
lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak equals 173 or 315 days after
the switch for an assumed R0 of WPV1 of 13 or 10, re-
spectively. For context, assuming the population size of
approximately 10 million people as of 2013 used in the
global model [10], the worst-case inadvertent tOPV SIA
coverage of 15 % corresponds to approximately 165,000
children in this population, while inadvertent tOPV SIA
coverage of 0.1 % corresponds to approximately 1,100
children. At inadvertent tOPV SIA coverage of 99 %, the
minimum time after the switch for this to lead to a
cVDPV2 outbreak extends to 651 and 875 days when
the R0 of WPV1 equals 13 and 10, respectively (not
shown in Fig. 2).
Figure 2b explores the minimum time until inadvert-
ent tOPV use can lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak as a func-
tion of the inadvertent tOPV SIA coverage for realistic
populations that include seasonal variation in poliovirus
transmissibility, so that the timing of the inadvertent
tOPV use relative to the seasonal fluctuations in R0
values affects the subsequent emergence of cVDPV2s.
All populations exhibit a sharp drop in the minimum
time until a cVDPV2 outbreak can occur with increasing
inadvertent tOPV SIA coverage, with the shortest time
for 10–20 % inadvertent tOPV SIA coverage, and an
increase in the minimum time for higher coverage
values, similar to Fig. 2a. However, the reality of season-
ality affects the shape of the curves. For example, due to
the assumed strong seasonality in the population with
properties like those of the under-vaccinated subpopula-
tion in the Ukraine (Table 1), increasing the inadvertent
tOPV SIA coverage from 0.1 to 0.5 % in this population
decreases the minimum time until inadvertent tOPV use
can lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak by over one year because
the higher initial prevalence of tOPV allows the cVDPV2
to emerge one high season earlier. The shortest times until
inadvertent tOPV use in an SIA can lead to a cVDPV2
outbreak occur in under-vaccinated populations with
properties like those of northern Pakistan and Afghanistan
and northern Nigeria, which coincide with the areas in
which interruption of WPV transmission proved most
challenging and in which very low RI coverage with IPV will
provide almost no population immunity to serotype 2 polio-
virus transmission after the switch. In historically under-
vaccinated populations in northern India, immunization
quality improved significantly during the last stages of
eradication, which if sustained will provide high population
immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission at the time
of the switch and will thus extend the time until inadvert-
ent tOPV use in a SIA can lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak,
despite the high R0 values in northern India (Table 1).
Figure 2b shows a significantly lower risk in general
populations compared to under-vaccinated populations
due to the expected higher population immunity to sero-
type 2 poliovirus transmission in the general populations
at the time of the switch (i.e., higher RI coverage and
SIA quality, as shown in Table 1). For the population
with properties like those of Ukraine, the difference
between the general and under-vaccinated populations
remains even more impressive, with the general popula-
tion (i.e., with 70 % RI coverage) sustaining high enough
population immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmis-
sion using IPV/bOPV or IPV-only schedules to prevent
cVDPV2 outbreaks following inadvertent tOPV use for
7 years or more (not shown in Fig. 2 due to the choice
of y-axis scale, but results included in Table 1). The abil-
ity of an IPV-only schedule to sustain high population
immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission in this
population with properties like those of Ukraine comes
from: (1) the higher relative proportion of transmissions
occurring via the oropharyngeal route, (2) the lower ab-
solute transmissibility of polioviruses in this setting (i.e.,
R0 of WPV1), and (3) the assumed use of a RI schedule
that includes at least 2 IPV doses for upper middle-
income countries (i.e., instead of 1 assumed for low- and
lower middle-income populations). Despite these advan-
tages, an under-vaccinated population with RI coverage
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of only 30 % but otherwise similar properties can gener-
ate a cVDPV2 outbreak following inadvertent tOPV use
almost as quickly after the switch as general populations
in northern India, northern Nigeria, and northern
Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Table 2 and Fig. 3 show the results of Analysis II of in-
advertent tOPV use in RI. In the hypothetical population
without seasonality and an R0 of WPV1 of 13, gradually
using up tOPV in the supply chain results in a cVDPV2
outbreak if the half-life (i.e., the time over which the
extent of tOPV use decreases by a half) corresponding to
this exponential decay process equals 0.16 years
(2 months) or more (Table 2) (the Additional file 1 shows
the kinetics of prevalence and evolution of OPV2-derived
viruses for the exponential decay pattern in this popula-
tion). We found similar minimum half-lives in populations
with properties like those of northern India due to their
high R0 values and resulting rapid drop in population im-
munity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission after the
switch, and in the under-vaccinated populations with
properties like those of northern Pakistan and Afghanistan
due to their low population immunity to serotype 2 polio-
virus transmission at the time of the switch and relatively
high R0 values (Table 1). Lower R0 values (e.g. in the hypo-
thetical population with lower R0, and populations like
Ukraine) result in longer minimum half-lives for an expo-
nential decay in inadvertent tOPV RI use to lead to a
cVDPV2 outbreak.
Figure 3a illustrates the relationship between the inad-
vertent tOPV RI proportion and its duration in the event
of continued inadvertent tOPV use in some fraction of
RI (rectangular pattern) in a hypothetical population
and Fig. 3b shows the results for realistic populations.
Figure 3a reveals generally similar patterns as with inad-
vertent tOPV use in an SIA (Fig. 2). However, because the
absolute RI coverage varies between the populations
(Table 1), the shortest durations occur for different inad-
vertent tOPV RI proportions in each realistic population,
and thus the shapes of the curves in Fig. 3b differ some-
what. For example, in the general population with proper-
ties like those of northern Pakistan and Afghanistan (with
POL3 coverage of 60 %), an inadvertent tOPV RI propor-
tion of 50 % represents much more tOPV use and thus
provides much more population immunity to serotype 2
poliovirus transmission than an inadvertent tOPV RI pro-
portion of 50 % in the under-vaccinated population with
properties like those of northern Pakistan and Afghanistan
(with POL3 coverage of 10 %). Consequently, the mini-
mum duration of inadvertent tOPV use in RI after the
switch for a cVDPV2 outbreak increases much faster







use in RI leads to a
cVDPV2 outbreak
Minimum duration (years) of rectangular inadvertent tOPV use in RI after the switch that
leads to a cVDPV2 outbreak, for indicated inadvertent tOPV RI proportion
0.5 % 1 % 5 % Proportion (given in parentheses) leading to shortest
minimum duration
Hypothetical population
- High R0 0.16 1.5 1.3 0.85 0.69 (0.25)
- Lower R0 0.27 2.2 1.9 1.3 1.2 (0.15)
Northern India,
- Under-vaccinated 0.16 1.8 1.2 0.92 0.83 (0.25)
- General 0.17 1.8 1.2 0.96 0.89 (0.2)
Northern Pakistan/Afghanistan
- Under-vaccinated 0.15 1.7 1.1 0.85 0.72 (0.5)
- General 0.22 1.9 1.4 1.0 0.95 (0.15)
Northern Nigeria
- Under-vaccinated 0.22 2.1 1.8 1.0 0.75 (0.4)
- General 0.32 2.7 2.1 1.7 1.6 (0.15)
Ukraine
- Under-vaccinated 0.81 2.7 2.1 1.7 1.6 (0.15)
- General -b -c -c -c -c
Abbreviations: cVDPV2 serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus, RI routine immunization, tOPV trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine
aSee Table 1 for assumed properties for each population
bWe observed either die-out of OPV2-related virus (for half-lives below approximately 4 years) or continued low-level circulation until the end of the analytical
time horizon (i.e., 2053) (for longer half-lives)
cNo cVDPV2 outbreak occurred for durations up to and including the last year of the analytical time horizon, although after > 15 years of inadvertent tOPV use in
RI, the cumulative incidence of vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis exceeded the detection threshold
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between 25 and 50 % RI coverage in the general popula-
tion than in the under-vaccinated population with proper-
ties like those of northern Pakistan and Afghanistan. In
the under-vaccinated population with properties like those
of Ukraine, the minimum duration of inadvertent tOPV
use in RI after the switch that leads to a cVDPV2 out-
break remains substantially longer due to the population
properties discussed in the context of Fig. 2b. With the
higher RI coverage of the general population of 70 %, no
duration of inadvertent tOPV use in RI leads to a
cVDPV2 outbreak, although after multiple years the in-
advertent tOPV use in RI would result in detection of
serotype 2 VAPP cases (depending on the inadvertent
tOPV RI proportion) and an increasing risk of exporting
OPV2-related viruses that can circulate in other popula-
tions at some point in time after the switch [14]. Over-
all, continued inadvertent tOPV use in RI leads to a
cVDPV2 outbreak somewhat later than inadvertent
tOPV use in an SIA.
Discussion
This study quantifies the minimum time after the tOPV-
bOPV switch until inadvertent tOPV use may cause a
cVDPV2 outbreak, assuming the recommended introduc-
tion of one IPV dose prior to the switch. Due to the kinet-
ics of inadvertent tOPV introductions and OPV evolution,
the results depend strongly on the proportion of children
in a spatially-homogenously mixing population that inad-
vertently receive tOPV. Moreover, different populations ex-
perience very different times until inadvertent tOPV use
may cause a cVDPV2 outbreak depending on their proper-
ties. Generally, higher basic reproduction numbers, lower
tOPV-induced population immunity to serotype 2 polio-
virus transmission at the time of the switch, and a lower
proportion of transmission occurring via the oropharyngeal
route all result in shorter times until inadvertent tOPV use
in an SIA can lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak. With the excep-
tion of the general population with properties like Ukraine,
which can maintain high enough population immunity to
serotype 2 poliovirus transmission for many years using an
IPV-only schedule, the modeled realistic populations repre-
sent some of the populations at highest risk of a cVDPV2
outbreak following inadvertent tOPV use. Thus, those pop-
ulations and particularly their under-vaccinated subpopula-
tions should warrant high scrutiny to ensure complete
tOPV withdrawal at the time of the switch. While we did
not model inadvertent tOPV use in all global populations,
we do not expect most populations with good vaccination
programs and relatively low R0 values to be able to gener-
ate cVDPV2 outbreaks following inadvertent tOPV use
within a year of the switch. However, additional popula-
tions probably exist with poorly performing vaccinations
programs (e.g., parts of sub-Saharan Africa, countries with
areas of social unrest) and/or high poliovirus transmissibil-
ity (Bangladesh, parts of sub-Saharan Africa, rest of India,
Pakistan, and Nigeria) that could experience a cVDPV2
outbreak following inadvertent use of large amounts of
tOPV as soon as 6 months after the switch. In all popula-
tions, inadvertent use of very small amounts of tOPV
seems unlikely to lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak for at least
1 year after the tOPV-bOPV switch.
The pattern of inadvertent tOPV use also affects the
potential for a resulting outbreak. If inadvertent tOPV
use occurs during an SIA, then this could lead to a
cVDPV2 outbreak as soon as 6 months after the switch
in the worst-case scenario among the populations we
analyzed. If inadvertent tOPV use continues to occur in
RI while gradually decreasing at a constant rate (e.g.,
exponential decay), then this could lead to a cVDPV2
outbreak if the extent of inadvertent tOPV use decreases
Fig. 3 Minimum time until inadvertent trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV) use in routine immunization (RI) leads to a serotype 2 circulating
vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) outbreak (Analysis II, rectangular pattern) a in a hypothetical population with no seasonality in the basic
reproduction number (R0) b in realistic populations with seasonality
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by half every 2 months or more in the worst-case sce-
nario. If inadvertent tOPV use occurs in RI at a constant
low level (i.e., rectangular pattern) then this may lead to
a cVDPV2 outbreak if it continues for at least 9 months
after the switch in the worst-case scenario.
The reality that inadvertent tOPV use can lead to a
cVDPV2 outbreak within a year of the switch in some
populations despite IPV introduction prior to the switch
supports the current policy of destroying all tOPV stocks
at the time of the switch rather than using those stocks
after the switch. Given limited global IPV supply, coun-
tries may be tempted to use any left-over tOPV stocks
after the switch if they do not have IPV in order to provide
vaccine recipients with immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus
infections. However, doing so would result in a risk of
causing cVDPV2 outbreaks after the switch. Due to the
great variability in when countries would introduce IPV
and the size of national stocks of tOPV, countries that
continued to use tOPV until they introduced IPV or
exhausted their tOPV stocks would likely stop using tOPV
at very different times, allowing OPV2-related viruses to
spread from countries continuing to use tOPV to coun-
tries in which population immunity to serotype 2 polio-
virus transmission has declined following cessation of
tOPV use. Such OPV2-related viruses could subsequently
evolve into cVDPV2s, leading to cVDPV2 outbreaks [14].
Thus, countries should plan to either use tOPV in their
supply chains prior to and not after the switch or to dis-
pose of tOPV promptly after the switch. Any supplies of
tOPV remaining at manufacturers at the time of the switch
could potentially go into an outbreak response stockpile
and find use as the preferred outbreak response vaccine for
some countries simultaneously responding to a cVDPV2
and WPV1 during the time period between the tOPV-
bOPV switch and the withdrawal of all types of OPV [11].
Our analysis relied on prior models [10, 14, 16] whose
limitations also apply to this analysis. Specifically, the
DEB model does not account for micro-level dynamics
and random events that play a role in cVDPV2 emer-
gences. The choice of the number of stages for OPV
evolution influences the flows between reversion stages
and thus when prevalence in an individual reversion stage
drops below the transmission threshold due to transitions
between reversion stages. Similarly, the multi-stage infec-
tion process with variable infectiousness for each infection
stage [16] affects the kinetics of prevalence and die-out
following an inadvertent tOPV release. Thus, as with all
models the choice of model structure may affect the re-
sults, and we rely on a previously developed and cali-
brated model structure [10, 14, 16]. Future research
may determine the importance of these assumptions and
how they impact the findings. Furthermore, the realistic
situations we modeled simplified the true vaccination his-
tories in those settings and thus do not necessarily reflect
the exact current conditions in those populations, al-
though we believe they represent reasonable approxima-
tions of high-risk populations that exist in the real world.
The results of the analyses also depend on the vaccination
policies shortly before and during the tOPV-bOPV switch.
For example, they assume well-implemented tOPV in-
tensification in all countries that need to supplement their
RI with SIAs before the switch [10, 27]. Failure to do so
will not only lead to emergence of indigenous cVDPV2s
after the switch in some populations [10, 27] and increase
the risk of cVDPV2s in the event of a non-synchronous
switch [14], but will also reduce the time until inadvertent
tOPV use can lead to a cVDPV outbreak. Conversely, out-
break response activities in Ukraine [28] may effectively
increase population immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus
transmission and increase the time until inadvertent tOPV
use can lead to a cVDPV outbreak. Finally, we did not
model all populations or explore the potential effect of re-
versed seasonality in the Southern Hemisphere, which
may increase or decrease the minimum time until inad-
vertent tOPV use can lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak.
Conclusions
Efforts to ensure timely and complete withdrawal of
tOPV at all levels, particularly from locations storing
large amounts of tOPV, will help to minimize risks asso-
ciated with the tOPV-bOPV switch. Under-vaccinated
populations with poor hygiene become at risk of a
cVDPV2 outbreak following inadvertent tOPV use the
soonest after the tOPV-bOPV switch and therefore
should represent priority areas to ensure tOPV withdrawal
from all OPV stocks.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Figure S1. Kinetics of prevalence and evolution of
OPV2-derived viruses for the exponential decay pattern in the hypothetical
population with a baseline R0 of WPV1 of 13. (EPI* = transmission threshold
of effective proportion infectious below which the force-of infection
becomes 0 in the differential equation-based model [15]). (PDF 1920 kb)
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